Post #11: Reading Response on Chapter Ten (Chia and Synott, 2009).

Chapter Ten: An issues-crisis perspective

The tenth chapter of our textbook revolves around issues and crises (plural form of 'crisis', if you didn't already know). A summary of the main points of this chapter follows:



- how PR practitioners respond to, and manage issues.

- the differences between an issue and a crisis; proactive issues management can therefore help to avert a crisis.

- the roles of PR practitioners during crisis situations as they break out

- the various types of crises, and the crisis life cycle

- how new media has impacted issues management and crisis PR.

We are therefore thrust into what is perhaps my favourite part of public relations, for this chapter finally allows me to understand issues and crises in greater detail. According to Chia & Synnott (2009), an issue occurs when there is a difference between the publics' expectations and an organisation's actions. If this issue is not managed well and is allowed to fester (much like a wound left untreated) then it will escalate into a crisis, which can then affect the organisation's viability, credibility and reputation. Sometimes, however, things are not so clear-cut and crisis occurrences can be unpredictable. 

With that, I would like to delve into a crisis that has happened in recent days: The Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant incidents and the resulting events that have since become a PR crisis for both the Japanese government as well as the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). This has happened as a result of the 2011 Tohoku region earthquake and tsunami, which resulted in damage to several of the nuclear reactors at the nuclear power plant, which has since caused localised environmental contamination. While it seems that this is one of those "unpredictable events" that turned into a crisis, I will further elaborate on how it might have been the result of several issues that have since escalated.

Firstly, using Pauchant and Mitroff (1992)'s classification of crises, we can identify the clusters in which the above crisis lies in. It is plainly obvious that the reactor explosions have led to radiation contamination of the environment, thus the crisis falls under the "Megadamage" cluster. In addition, reports have surfaced on cover-ups and negligence in plant operations (The Straits Times, 2011) (refer to relevant reports over the past few days in The Straits Times), and there will certainly be occupational health problems for the brave souls who have volunteered to help repair the reactor and to ascertain and contain the damage. For TEPCO, and also the government, this is therefore a severe crisis with additional areas that need to be addressed.

With an idea of what category this incident falls under, we can now look at the stages of the crisis life cycle and analyse what has happened (Howard & Miller, 2006, as cited in Chia & Synnott, 2009). The Fukushima No. 1 nuclear accidents escalated quickly from the prodromal phase. By this time, the reactors already suffered varying degrees of physical damage due to the combined effects of the earthquake and the tsunami. The preparation phase was basically passed over. However, if reports on TEPCO's earlier mismanagement (e.g. the falsification of safety records, inspection failures as well as government-sanctioned extensions [The Straits Times, 2011]) were to be believed, then it would be that the entire incident was just waiting to happen. Had TEPCO come clean about these issues and actively managed and resolved them when it could, the situation might not have been this bad today. Then again, no one would have expected a disaster of this magnitude. A learning point from this would be that even the smallest of issues can result in potentially damaging consequences in the future.

The crisis is actually in Phase Three, or the acute phase, now. Media coverage of the crippled reactors (e.g. pictures and images of smoke rising from the various containment buildings, reports of the 180 workers who stayed behind to assist in containment efforts, the inconveniences brought about by the accidents, etc.) has been especially intense, and both TEPCO and the government PR practitioners must have been working overtime to manage the flow of information. Much of the information appears to come from the government-designated spokesperson, the Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano Yukio, and TEPCO, although its president has been criticised heavily for their poor management of the situation and limited information flow initially (see here). Our role, of course, is to make sure that honesty is adhered to in times like this and any worthwhile information should be made known immediately. Senior company executives might disagree, but in this ethics versus economics struggle, I do believe (however ideal it may be) that coming clean is better for everyone.

As the crisis slowly comes under control, we will then see Phases Four and Five emerge. We already know how the reactors came to explode and almost melt down, this phase will see heads roll. The reactor will definitely not be used again, and the surrounding area likely to be quarantined, but TEPCO must, at this stage, be prepared to suffer legal consequences and make restitutions to the community at large. For PR practitioners, now would be the time to clarify all the facts as presented and stave off any malicious rumours that may be brought up.  In Phase Five, TEPCO (and by extension, the Japanese government), must close the chapter on this crisis properly and learn from the lessons of this disaster. I believe the very least that would come from this is the tightening of regulations on nuclear reactors across the country and shoring defences against yet another natural disaster of this scale. It is in our interest as PR practitioners not to let the shadow of nuclear catastrophe loom over once again, and any other mistakes MUST be corrected right now before it is too late.

With that, I end this week's reflection.